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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

# THE "SELF" IN CURRENT PHILOSOPHY

RECENT scientific and philosophic thought is at a far remove from those times when the self was considered a completely encapsulated entity within the human body. Present tendencies are in the direction of defining the self from the standpoint of the space-time matrix within which it is set. Some thinkers, however, hold that the experience of selfhood is subject to conditions which are not external but imply a universal order of another kind; according to them the reality of selfhood can not be understood in a (merely) spatiotemporal way. The conflict of these two modes of thought may be illustrated, respectively, in the "new naturalism" of S. Alexander and (perhaps) A. N. Whitehead on the one hand, and the "transcendental realism" of A. A. Bowman on the other.[1] In the former view, the self is simply a function of the space-time matrix; in the latter, it is that, and something more—just *what*, is the problem such a thinker as Bowman undertakes to solve.[2] And Bowman is not alone; some current investigations in psychology appear to seek the same "deeper" understanding of selfhood.[3] A rather simple approach to the problem will lead to an analysis of these contributions.

Just as the "common-sense" philosopher does not think of an *object* as nothing beyond the series of his perceptions, but as the objective counterpart, guaranteed by experience, of the fact that one presentation is the transformable equivalent of others, so also he does not regard his *self* as nothing but the series of his mental states. Not possessing psychological training, never having read (perhaps) empirical discussions of the self—from William James's *Principles of Psychology*[4] to Gardner Murphy's *Personality: A*

[1] See the present writer's discussion of these views, in connection with religion: "The Interaction of Religion and Philosophy," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, Vol. XVI (1947), pp. 371–380; and "The Concept of Religion: A Study of A. A. Bowman," *The Journal of Religion*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, January, 1948.

[2] A. A. Bowman, *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*, Macmillan & Co., London, 1938.

[3] W. Köhler, *Gestalt Psychology*, Liveright Publishing Corp., New York, 1947.

[4] New York, 1918 (2 vols.).

*Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure*[5]—the plain man conceives that self to have something of the independent nature and invariableness which, in the external world, he has attributed to an independently real object. For the common-sense view, mental states are not a series of equivalents or transformations (as presentations are); for the plain man the selfhood which he experiences as observer is not interpreted as the counterpart, objectively, of the transformability of one experience into another. He thinks that his self has a kind of invariable identity which is somehow maintained through succeeding changes. Moreover, he does not view it as being, relatively, quite so simple a thing as he conceives the object to be. The ordinary man believes that the object has its constancy in the equivalence of perceptions which experience has conditioned (or taught) him to transform "at sight." But the non-equivalence of mental states is, on the contrary, a fundamental feature of his experience of selfhood.

Now, is our plain man right in this "intuition"? Are we here in the region of meanings which are not reducible, as meanings elsewhere may be, to the mere relatedness of one objective content to another? A. A. Bowman[6] and W. Köhler,[7] representing in their own ways the fields of philosophy and psychology, present a point of view which has inspired much of the present discussion and which, in the case of Bowman, has provided a framework for further inquiry. Bowman is convinced that "naturalism"—which includes phenomenalism and (even) common sense—does not give a full account of the facts. He trusts the judgments of the common man, however, as against the analyses of (say) James or Bertrand Russell, believing that the former's intuition simply requires critical elucidation. The critique of experience, presented by Bowman, involving common-sense judgments, provides us with his doctrine designated as "transcendental realism." He feels that the philosophic tradition has been wrong in defining self-experience by sole reference to an object.[8]

## I. Bowman on Experience

Bowman is concerned to show that meanings involving selfhood must be understood in the light of what it means for anything whatever, object or mental state, to be the object or state of a *self*.

[5] Harper & Bros., New York, 1947.

[6] *Op. cit.*

[7] *Op. cit.*

[8] Cf. William James, *The Meaning of Truth*, p. 106; Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 67. Respectively, these authors speak of "one experience knowing another" and of "data being criticized by data."

Seeing no *a priori* reason why a self need be defined by reference to an object, Bowman is prepared to regard the self as what the subject (a subject-self in process of observing) is all along, and particularly what it is when every "vestige of an object has disappeared from consciousness."[9] He believes that the question as to how we apparently insist on thinking of ourselves as one and identical, which, as we have noted, is a leading characteristic of the experience of selfhood, carries us far beyond the analysis of common sense—though it is implied in the plain man's attitude toward his self. But if common sense (and phenomenalism)[10] will not do, what is the "fuller" truth? From the point of view of the actual experience of selfhood, as a fact,[11] Bowman undertakes to answer.

He finds, in regard to the "data" of experience, that there has been a strong tendency in modern thought to limit experience to the consciousness of an object on the part of a subject. This he believes to be a partial, one-sided view of the problem. We have no warrant for supposing that experience is the product of data, or even that (in the sense indicated) it "contains" data. Bowman believes that in experience "there is nothing that is absolutely given; or if anything is given, it is given in the form of those natural conditions upon which experience depends, but which do not ordinarily constitute any part of its content. This does not mean that they are unknown or unknowable, but that the knowledge of them belongs, on the whole, not to experience as such, but only to certain special forms of experience which we call reflection or scientific investigation."[12] Thus, "sensa" or "data" can not be viewed as *given* other than in a quite limited meaning. That is, granted an already existent experience—Bowman sometimes speaks of it as a "universal process"—it is possible to analyze them out of it. They are given only with the experience which *includes* them. (Bowman uses the word "includes," apparently, in a rather active sense, in contrast to the merely passive notion of data as being present in experience.) Consequently, data are never given in any sense in which that experience, of which modern philosophy would suppose them to be (somehow) elements, is not also given. According to Bowman, experience no more implies these "data" than they imply experience; yet, for him, they are the product of experience in a far more basic sense than any in which experience could be claimed to be a product of the sensa or

[9] Bowman, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 410.

[10] Considered later.

[11] See Köhler's discussion; *op. cit.*, pp. 323ff, esp. p. 332.

[12] *Op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 227.

data within it. Bowman believes that it is the fact of change or motion, the view that all experience is a process, that we must consider, as we note that "sense-data" never become objects of experience unless experience and its processes make them such. In short, data do not embody what is "most primitive" in experience. Experience properly understood, therefore, is "not the sequence of its own objective contents."[13] There is *something* that can not be discerned simply as its successive phases but which is prior to them. For Bowman this would be the "universal nature of the process whereby the objects of experience find their way successively into our consciousness."[14] Bowman searches for words to describe this something which is (and involves) the process of reality.[15]

Influenced by the "hormic" (or purposive) psychology of William McDougall,[16] Bowman substitutes, in place of the mass of perceptual data or sensa, that which he designates (for want of a better word) "instinct." (It is probable that even under McDougallian influence Bowman is using this word in an intentionally different sense than that in which it is used in psychology, where, due to confusion of different meanings, the word is falling into disuse.) He finds that "instinct" is (as a function of the universal process) the elemental (or at least *an* elemental) thing in experience. Experience can not, in Bowman's view, be identified simply and exclusively with the data which constitute one of its aspects or types (i.e., the feature of it marked by the presence of an object confronting a conscious, observing subject). The view he takes is that the intentional and emotional elements must be given equality with the intellectual in that unity of experience which would combine all three of them. This means that so far as we are in a position to define human nature—and our perspective is far more limited than modern science sometimes appreciates—in terms of its "original" endowment ("instinct" or, to use another of Whitehead's terms, "vagueness"),[17] man must be conceived in the complete sense as a psychophysical organism. The psychophysical adjustment of man to his environment has led, in his development, to a standpoint of *interpretation*, which may be called

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] *Op. cit.*

[15] Cf. A. N. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, pp. 209–210, 231–235; and *Process and Reality* (*passim*); the "causal efficacy" of factors not vouchsafed to ordinary sense-perception expresses what Bowman is discussing.

[16] See *Psychologies of 1930*, Clark University Press, 1930, Carl Murchison, ed.

[17] *Op. cit.*

a "first stabilization."[18] From this vantage-ground there have emerged, in Bowman's opinion, those stereotyped products of experience of which the well-defined presentational contents,[19] which are the familiar "objects" of daily experience, are illustrative. This is what we mean when we speak of "sense-data." Viewed in this way, data are such as may be "relied upon." But this first stabilization is, says Bowman, a vantage-point *and* an enigma. Following Bergson, Bowman points out that man may proceed from it to the task of exploring and discovering new possibilities ("aspiration") or he may fall back on established meanings ("instinct").[20] Man may remain under the dominance of habit or he may seek a transvaluation of values already reached. But while this conscious process is essential to "progress" man should never forget the "vagueness" and "intuition" (Whitehead) which is consonant with (perhaps synonymous with) that original "common sense" of mankind. In a slightly different, but relevant, connection Whitehead remarks: "Common sense tells you at once what is meant. But unfortunately there is no adequate analysis of common sense, because it involves our relation to the infinity of the Universe."[21] And Professor Johnson adds: "Thus, clear and exact statements only appear so when they are arbitrarily and artificially sundered from their background of presuppositions—presuppositions which defy analysis because of their vast extent."[22]

Bowman's treatment of experience reaches, as beyond the view of common sense, that which he calls the "scientific" viewpoint; he claims that his view, after the fashion of science, formulates laws drawn from experience and finds those laws to be an interpretation of, and applicable to, "experience in general." He denies that the knowledge of existence is exclusively inferential; and he denies that the *total span* of consciousness is co-terminous with the consciousness that defines itself in the relation of an object to a subject. (Thus, we when awaking can be said to be conscious before we are conscious of anything but "ourselves.") The unit of ex-

[18] Bowman, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 231.

[19] Cf. Whitehead's comments on consciousness: "Those elements of our experience which stand out clearly and distinctly are not its basic facts. . . . For example, consciousness only dimly illuminates the prehensions in the mode of causal efficacy. . . . But prehensions in the mode of presentational immediacy are among those prehensions which we enjoy with the most vivid consciousness" (*Process and Reality*, New York: Macmillan Co., 1929; quoted by A. H. Johnson, *The Journal of General Psychology*, Vol. 32, 1945, p. 192).

[20] H. Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, New York: H. Holt & Co., 1935.

[21] Paper on "Immortality," in *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead* (P. A. Schilpp, ed.), Evanston, Northwestern University, 1941, p. 699.

[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 201.

perience is not determined by isolated flashes of apprehension but is a process in time, a complex thing more nearly expressible in terms of "instinctual process," of which *cognition is but one aspect.* Indeed Bowman doubts whether experience is co-terminous with consciousness. He thinks that experience might even make place in itself for the subconscious and unconscious, so that even the lowliest forms of existence—perchance inanimate things—could claim to be considered in some sense selves, i.e., they may have an unconscious experience of their own.[23] Bowman queries, at any rate, whether this is not at least thinkable. However, as to his main point, consciousness is to be defined in terms of experience, not experience in terms of consciousness. This seems to be an audacious assertion, Bowman admits. But he holds to it, as against phenomenalism, which denies consciousness, or an alternative view which treats it like any datum of experience rather than as implying the existence of a personal self.[24]

The problem of conscious selfhood is clarified when, in dealing with the related subjects of experience, consciousness, and *activity,* Bowman finds that even when consciousness of effort is present it does not define activity; it rather *implies* it. He finds that activity defines itself as the power, actually exercised, to "overcome obstruction." Activity, in this sense, would be a primitive type of experience, even as "instinct" (defined in Bowman's sense) is. But it is not to be assumed that it is simple. Bowman considers it to be conscious, volitionally directed activity, as we view it in life, wherein he finds three factors distinguishable: the will to do, *that which* we will to do, and the doing of it. He notes that the relation between the first two may be expressed by saying that the volition is an actual experience of activity "with an ideal element (*that which*)."[25] The third factor "presents an anomalous situation involving two different types of experience."[26] Bowman observes that first we experience the actual doing of what we will to do; second, the action "reports itself to us phenomenally under the aspect of observed motion."[27] It would seem, then, that the experience of moving is a "two-sided thing, experienced in two different ways."[28] The first way is found to conform to the same kind of experience as volition; the second way conforms

[23] There is an interesting discussion of this question in F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality,* London, Swan, Sonnenschein & Co. (1893), 1906.

[24] See above, footnote 8.

[25] Bowman, *op. cit.,* vol. II, p. 263.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] *Ibid.*

to the "subject-object" type of experience. Bowman believes that it is here that a "fundamental cleavage" occurs, so that taking experience in its totality, it falls into two divisions: "first, the experience of doing what we will; second, the experience of observing the phenomenon which we call movement or change of place."[29] Yet—and here is a further aspect of the total experience, the connection, namely, *in experience* of the two divisions or types of experience noted—we treat the motion presented to our observation as the equivalent, phenomenally, of the motion (or movement) which we experience directly as our own activity. It is Bowman's belief that this transformability of one aspect of experience into another provides a key for the interpretation of the experience as a whole. He feels now that he has reached "a conception of experience which is neither purely activist nor purely phenomenal but which moves from the experience of action to that of phenomena and back again with the utmost freedom."[30]

It would appear, then, that our conscious life is based on "the assumption that one and the same thing reports itself to us as our own activity and indirectly as an observable change in space-time."[31] This would bring us to a question of fundamental importance: "Do things move in the activist sense of the term?" Bowman finds that *if* there were an affirmative answer it would follow "by logical conversion" that in some instances at least activity would be the equivalent of motion. But actually to answer the question, Bowman makes a distinction between modes of experience, as contrasted with facts.[32] He points out that it is a fact that we exist but that this is not an object of experience, i.e., "we do not experience our existence in the first instance as a fact, the content of a noun clause of which we are the subjects."[33] It would seem that our existence may be understood "rather as experience itself yielding up what it means to be a subject," so that in this sense "our existence may be called a mode of experience."[34] (Experience is capable of other modes; e.g., in activity, experience yields up what it means to be an "agent." This, another of the characteristics of experience, is also describable as a mode.) Now, in distinction from these "meanings," the existence of the object, which is a fact—an object which is guaranteed by experience—does not relate itself to the experience which is its guarantee in the

[29] *Ibid.*
[30] *Op. cit.*, p. 265.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 266.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 267.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 267–268.

same way that the existence of the subject relates itself to the subject's experience. That is, "the object's existence does not go with the experience of *having* an object, as the subject's existence goes with the experience of *being* a subject."[35] That is, "existence in this case is not simply experience itself yielding up still another of its meanings."[36] So, Bowman asserts, we can not tell from experience "what it means for an object to exist, but we can tell what it means for a subject to exist. . . . [Indeed] *in this sense* we cannot experience the existence of an object at all."[37] (None the less, he admits, we do have experience of objects; and we have such experience in the sense that we could not have it without the object's being "there," independently real and manifested through perceptual processes. But this existence of the object "goes with the object," and that of the subject "goes with the subject.")[38]

Thus Bowman has presented us with the distinction between "facts" and "modes" of experience; the former denotes objects as objectively experienced, the latter subjects as subjectively experienced. This would mean that what is experienced as the existence of the object, in contradistinction to the object *per se*, is the fact that the object exists; it does not indicate what existence means as experienced "either by the object or the subject."[39] Finally, then, Bowman applies his distinction to the question raised:[40] Do things move in the activist sense of the term? He is now convinced that if there are subconscious or unconscious beings that exist, to which we may possibly ascribe activity, that activity is unknowable to us in the way in which we know our own activity—i.e., as a "mode" of experience. But, if it is the case that independent *reals* are guaranteed, as to their existence, as "facts" of experience (not "modes"), it may be that the same thing is true of activity. This activity would be "conceived as the activity of other selves or of independently existing objects, and as experienced in the same sense in which the existence of such objects is experienced, namely, as a fact."[41]

At once we see, in this latter connection, that a new view of experience, existence, and selfhood is required. The distinction between facts and modes of experience has precipitated a reconsideration of the last of these especially.

[35] *Op. cit.*, pp. 267–268, italics Bowman's.
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] *Ibid.*, italics ours.
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] *Op. cit.*, p. 269.
[40] See above.
[41] *Op. cit.*, p. 269.

## II. The Nature of Selfhood

Bowman's discussion has given us evidence that there is complexity, not mere simplicity, in all that exists. Evidently, the "existents" (of existence) are not mere terms, but in some sense "selves." Biology, for example, perhaps more definitely than physics, does not rest on a phenomenalist basis; it regards existents as having a complex inner nature. (To be sure, modern physics now stresses the structure of energy.) Köhler, who has emphasized the fact that the organism is a complex unit not resolvable into simple units, closes one of his books, which is full of experimental data, with the remark: "[It] seems to be the natural fate of Gestalt Psychology to become Gestalt Biology."[42] Kurt Goldstein too, in his work with aphasic patients, has shown that their incapacities are related to the organism as a functional whole and not to the isolated units to which such incapacities appear on superficial examination to be related.[43] This is of significance, in that the "existent" has the complexity of a self, and its "relations," are such as to be "for itself." The organism, experienced as a self—a self existing for itself—in relation to an environment, enters into that environment as a differentiated unity; the environment sets itself "off" as a system of relations into which the organism "enters"—not as a simple unit, but as a complex one. The organism is part of an environment which exists, at least to some degree, for it. But is this not phenomenalism? We shall have to make a distinction, it seems, between nature seen as a system of selves *and* as phenomenalistic; both views may be held, and the question is: Must the latter exclude the former? Nature appears to assume the aspect of externally related contents on the one hand and that of a system of selves on the other. This problem appears in the history of psychology as the distinction between psychic processes as "acts" (which are "holistic") and the "contents" to which they are directed. Franz Brentano,[44] for example, distinguished between the hearing of a tone and the tone one hears. It should be noted that he was not returning, in this view, to speculative psychology, but stating what for him was empirically the case. Many influential adherents of Brentano's position could be listed, such as James Ward in his article "Psychology" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* who not only recognized but emphasized the activity of the self or subject. Harald Höffding,[45] too,

[42] *Op. cit.,* p. 359.

[43] *Human Nature,* Harvard University Press, 1940.

[44] Cf. E. Heidbreder, *Seven Psychologies,* Appleton Century Co., New York, 1933, p. 206.

[45] *Outlines of Psychology,* The Macmillan Co., New York, 1896.

treated psychological processes as modes of activity. Such processes were ways in which the whole mind operates on different occasions.

There are forms of experience in which a knowledge of relations outruns, so to say, our ability to discover what it is that sustains these relations. Thus, beyond the fringe of enveloping circumstance, i.e., the facts about nature (phenomena), is the problem of what it may be in *itself*. It is true that the sciences, biology, for example, must remain "naturalistic" and hold fast to the usual method and standpoint: observation, hypotheses, experiment, verification. At the same time, however, life is the actual experience of being alive, not as a fact or phenomenon primarily but as a mode of experience. Moreover, the unity of the self is, at least to considerable extent, sustained by both conscious and unconscious states. There is to some degree an identity of experience. Life as an actual mode of experience is common to states both conscious and not conscious; in this sense it is the experienced continuity of being underlying the difference between being conscious and being unconscious. Life is common to both experiences.[46]

It would seem, then, that our discussion permits us to consider "inanimate" nature as a system of selves, with relative degrees of capacity for bearing experience. But while biological science has granted, in some of its aspects, a view of nature such as to permit reference to it as a system of selves, we can not generalize too freely into the realm of inorganic things from this biological position. (It may be the case that the "inanimate" in no sense "bears experience.") If we carefully note the approach of phenomenalism to nature, there seems to be, to an unprejudiced observer, a leaning in a direction which implies the covert admission of a realm of selves. Also, if without bias we study the "holistic" approach to nature, that view of nature which sees it as consisting of selves appears restricted by a certain opaqueness in the selfhood of natural objects so that it is forced to lean in the direction of phenomenalism.

In considering "data" phenomenalism sees them as given *to* consciousness but not *with* an experience which includes them; yet consciousness (if it is admitted at all) is only a phenomenon among phenomena. But the phenomenalist admits that consciousness is not a datum in the sense in which they are. It is not given in the same way. Here the view breaks down. What *is* given is a totality of conditions, the question being whether among the conditions there are some which are not the objective content of presentations. As A. S. Eddington has said: "It is by looking into our

[46] For a different view of experience see E. S. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion*, Prentice-Hall, New York, 1946, pp. 1, 529.

own nature that we first discover the failure of the physical universe to be co-extensive with our experience of reality."[47] Asking the question: "What is the ultimate truth about ourselves?" Eddington remarks: "Various answers suggest themselves. We are a bit of stellar matter gone wrong. We are physical machinery—puppets that strut and talk and laugh and die as the hand of time pulls the strings beneath. But there is one elementary inescapable answer. We are that which asks the question."[48] Then he says: "The '*something* to which truth matters' must surely have a place in reality whatever definition of reality we adopt. In our own nature, or through the contact of our consciousness with a nature transcending ours, there are other things [than the physical universe] that claim the same . . . recognition—a sense of beauty, of morality, and finally at the root of all spiritual religion an experience which we describe as . . . God."[49] Finally, Eddington comments: "Shall I not add that even as light and color and sound come into our minds at the prompting of a world beyond, so these other stirrings of consciousness come from something which, whether we describe it as beyond or deep within ourselves, is greater than our own personality?"[50]

These statements would mean, then, that even a very distinguished scientist does not regard the "data" of physics to be co-extensive with our experience of reality. The "something" concerned about truth-discovery is accorded a "place in reality" by Eddington as well as by Köhler and Bowman. It is the contention of these men that life, in its expression, reveals itself as marked by unity and concern for truth. The present writer believes that on the whole the work of G. W. Allport[51] lends support to this opinion, wherein "congruence" is found among the "traits" which characterize a given personality. The comprehensive and critically incisive discussion of the self in Gardner Murphy's treatise[52] provides contemporary philosophers with a wealth of information on the empirical study of the self which demands reflection and discussion beyond the scope of our present effort.

JOHN K. MCCREARY

BATES COLLEGE

[47] *New Pathways in Science*, pp. 306ff.
[48] *Ibid.*
[49] *Ibid.*, italics and material in brackets ours.
[50] *Op. cit.*, pp. 317–318.
[51] *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*, New York, 1937.
[52] *Personality: A Biosocial Approach*, Harper & Bros., New York, 1947.

## A TRANSACTIONAL CONCEPTION OF EXPERIENCE AS ART

WHEN philosophers philosophize on experience, they most likely think of experience in terms of thinking experience. This fixation on thinking in addition to the traditional burden imposed on philosophers' minds by the school of introspective psychology naturally leads them to fragmentize experience. As a matter of fact experience is essentially and fundamentally an action, a behavior, or a conduct. We have no difficulty in thinking of an action, a behavior, or a conduct as an integral unity. We never ask such silly questions as, How can an actor act on the acted? We just take any action as real, as natural, as objective, as immediate, as direct, as a whole, as it is. Action in itself, moreover, is neither mental nor material, neither mind nor body. Analytically, both mental and material, both subjective and objective, both mind and body, are involved in one action, and this involvement is so perfect and so universal that no general problem can ever be posed against it. Besides, the transition from one act to another is as natural as the push and pull of waves. There is therefore no possibility of raising the problem of connection in general in this respect. Actions are always in action. This inness insures the internal continuity from one action to another. Most important of all, an action is definite and determinate, and therefore always real. An action is a real action, no matter whether the action is right or wrong, good or bad, internal or external. An action once committed is irrevocable. It is historically, existentially, and therefore "metaphysically" there. An action is always a specific action. Thinking in terms of universals is still a specific action. There can be no thinking in general. For there can never be action in general.

The above position is established, generally speaking, through our association with the implications of the word "action." But the conception of experience in terms of action is not merely a matter of linguistic association. The association is established fundamentally on an existential basis: "Every experience, of slight or tremendous import, begins with an impulsion, rather [it begins] *as* an impulsion" (Dewey, *Art As Experience*, p. 58). The word "impulsion" no doubt bears biological implications. Only in a naturalistic and biological matrix can any psychological function be intelligibly interpreted. On the other hand, this biological implication makes pertinent the distinction between an organism and its environment within an experience as a whole biologically interpreted. For impulsion designates a movement outward and

forward. Environment is essentially environing, a field of action. Adaptation is therefore more than a correspondence between environment and action; action and environing are correlative or interpenetrating. This is why action is inter-action. This interaction, being alive, inevitably proliferates and "ferments"; this proliferation or "fermentation" constitutes history. In this sense experience is assimilated to history. Thus outwardness and forwardness can neither be theoretically traced nor practically directed without such a biological interpretation of historical experience.

The above behavioral exposition of experience tells us that experience is originally not thinking at all. It is a natural happening. The happening is originally neither human nor inhuman. It is an occasion, an event, a matter of fact, just as water falls, stones roll, birds fly, and volcanoes erupt. Metaphysically, it is as it is, neither good nor bad. Good or bad, right or wrong, beautiful or ugly, are qualifications added in and to it. Although this addition is of tremendous importance in a certain perspective, its importation from a wider perspective is as factual, as scientifically understandable, as anything else. We shall find that only in virtue of its factual character can importance maintain itself as importance.

For the time being, it is enough to remind ourselves that experience is ex-perience. It is ex-ward always. Even introspection is spectacular. Otherwise there is no possibility of introspection. Experience is by its very nature extrovert, it is a deal, a deal of life or death, happiness or sorrow, satisfaction or frustration. The feeling of life must be a feeling of something. This something in its turn stimulates every cell of the organism into action, vibration, or disturbance. This vibration or disturbance, excitement or emotion, gives the most pervasive thing in this world, the enjoyment of life, history and culture, in one word, experience. As an action, an experience as a whole is active, vital, and dynamic. The activity is not confined to organism alone. Environment participates in an enterprise, to respond, to reject, to refuse, to correspond, to order, to obey, to remain, or to change. The whole setting is in motion. The motion is carried on continuously and integrally.

Experience as art has two senses. It is art in the sense of esthetic and art in the sense of artistic. For experience as an action must have a quality of doing and of what is done. "Esthetic" refers to the immediate doing, "artistic" refers to such quality of what is done as is necessary for further esthetic qualities.

Each specific experience has its own color tone. Even the most commonplace experience has its own esthetic flavor. This flavor

is its consummatory phase, which does not end in the mind of an organism. It pervades the whole situation. This is because experience is essentially a doing, an action. The esthetic quality of an experience as an action is first of all "going to be qualified as a whole," not wholly there at the start not revealing itself as a datum. The essence of this truth can be seen from an analysis of the *S–R* pattern. Stimulus is not appealing to any and every organism and response is not without specific readiness. In soliciting a corresponding response, stimulus selects its own patron, whether a victim or a favored son. In responding to a stimulus response is responding to the call. The *S–R* relation is neither accidental hit or miss from the beginning to the end nor simple perfect harmonious motion at the very beginning. They are mutually conditioning, behaving towards each other. "Esthetic" as the carrying through of this mutuality therefore should be attributed to the whole experiential situation.

The esthetic quality can be seen again in pathological cases. Before the esthetic disintegration is found out, pathology is out of the question. So long as the pathological victim enjoys or is allowed to enjoy his dream as if it were real enjoyment, so far the case is not pathological. The tragedy begins when the dreamer awakes or is awakened, finding that the real world is not the world he believes in, that his belief is only a make-believe. Esthetic integrity has a radical "turn back." And the victim's felt pathos is this painful turning back. A rosy past thus is turned into a gloomy present. The gloomy now is much more gloomy, for it covers the whole scene, not just the victim's mind alone.

The esthetic quality can be seen again in qualitative thinking. By qualitative thinking we mean that thinking never takes place in isolation. Thinking is always fringed with an atmosphere. This atmosphere buoys thinking from falling down into a dead entity and also contains it in a room so that its energy can be conserved and focussed. Thinking thus must be an adjustment and adaptation. As adaptation and adjustment, it is enjoyed or suffered. This enjoying or suffering comes from an esthetic background which is non-thinking in contexture.

Thinking can be more than qualitative; it can be formulated in affective terms. If thought itself were not affective thought, then thinking could not be so enjoyable for professional philosophers. In this context, thinking is no longer considered merely for some other biological purpose, but it is itself a biological function. Unless it is esthetic, it can not be enjoyed. When we call the proper rhythm of thought logic, we are apt to take thinking as cool, rational, and colorless. But actual thinking rises and ebbs,

is excited and depressed, rests and moves, is tangled and straightened, is just as colorful as anything else. Moreover, the medium of thinking is not confined to words alone. Thus the affective quality of language can be best illustrated by our day-dreams.

Lastly, the esthetic quality of our experience as an action is intensively embodied in art. Experience as art, as characteristically embodied, does away with the fictitious boundary between organism and environment. This submergence of thought into the currents of life vivifies experience by giving life to esthetic quality.

As *inter*-action, experience maintains its integrity; as inter*action* experience implies change. Intelligence is a unique function of this change. It is with respect to this unique function that we speak of experience as art in its second sense, i.e., artistic. "Intelligence" is originally an adverb rather than a noun. It is first of all a sort of action which exhibits competency, stability, or workability. When this competency becomes regular, orderly, or graceful it is called "intelligence." Intelligence as art, in this sense, is experience directed. The artistic aspect of experience thus comes to the foreground.

The esthetic quality and the artistic quality of experience need no theoretical integration; their qualitative identification is a practical effort and achievement. An artistic behavior is observed and observable. The attribution of "insight" to Köhler's chimpanzee is a theoretical superfluity. For the word "insight" or "intelligence," rightly used, is a summary notation of the observable serial behaviors transacted by a chimpanzee in a situation. Intelligence or insight is therefore an adjective to describe the quality of this series of behavior instead of a noun referring to a mental power or faculty on the part of the chimpanzee. The word "artistic" stands essentially for a quality of behavior or behaviors. So do the words "intelligence" and "insight." It is therefore a retreat to faculty psychology, logically speaking, when any Gestalt is interpreted as predisposed in an individual mind and when the word "intelligence" is used to refer to this power. On the other hand, it is a surrender to sensationalists when any Gestalt is supposed to be an organization in and by itself and the word "intelligence" refers to our power of "in-sighting" this organization. In both cases, we formulate a theory of intelligence without due reference to the observation procedure through which a behavioral state of intelligence, not a mental power called intelligence, is studied.

This can be better illustrated in the case of human intelligence. The most "scientific" study of human intelligence has been the so-called I. Q. test. A person of a certain age performs a specific

kind of work the result of which is compared to the average achievement of persons of the same age. This study is scientific to the degree that this conception, "I. Q.," tells what the person has specifically done instead of what kind of or how much mental power he has in reserve. A man with a high I. Q. is looked upon as a "bright" man in general and it is forgotten that this brightness is only a description of his performance of a specific kind of work which may be quite irrelevant to other situations. Similarly, a man having a low I. Q. is subject to various discriminations. Calculated from a specific procedure, the conception of intelligence is overgeneralized into a mental power which is supposed to be constant and is in practice too much relied upon as an important criterion of discrimination.

Philosophically, the esthetic quality of experience has long been the last stronghold of introspective psychology. For the inalienability of a toothache and a satisfaction from a cool drink to our organism is so unique that individualism seems ultimately warranted. The conception of mental power, logically speaking, is only a theoretical amplification of the uniqueness of this private, individual life. Through the behavioral observation and the phenomenal description of our artistic life, we begin to realize that the uniqueness of human life consists not in its privateness, but in its observable sequentiality, consistency, and continuity. Our instant by instant individual life would not mean anything unless it entered a more comprehensive or comprehensible situation. If a toothache is inaccountable, it loses its esthetic quality as well as its "significant form" for experience. If a cool drink satisfies in and by itself, probably no satisfaction will be felt at all. The important thing in human life is therefore not the alienability or inalienability of individual life but the accountability of each phase or each moment in a life to that life in its wider perspectives.

The wholeness of our life is not a given reality. Neither does it exist in general. It is built up. Life is organized as a whole specifically. As a matter of fact, the word "whole" stands for the sequentiality, the consistency, and the continuity—in one word, the organization of our actions. This organization is through our action of organizing. "To organize" is a specific quality of experience, a specific practical effort toward organized behavior. For "organicists," on the other hand, organized behavior is a natural gift in general to be celebrated.

This view of experience as an action and an art, philosophically speaking, can meet many fundamental traditional problems; among them we discuss three:

(1) The problem: Is existence independent of experience? Since experience is always specific, the question is not properly put. Independence of experience is impossible, not because existence always presupposes an experiencer, but because experience itself is always a specific kind of existing. There is no sense in saying "independence of experience in general," because there is no experience in general. If by independence of experience, we mean independence of all experiences, then, first of all, the experiences should be specified one by one; secondly, the procedure of being independent must also be specified. Independent of hearing, the original sound experience becomes a wave. The becoming is not a natural process, but artificial, derivatively, scientifically determined. Therefore existence independent of experience is not existence naïvely prior to any experience but existence scientifically specified in experience.

Furthermore, traditionally, the problem is a "philosopher's" problem. In other words, both the problem and the answers are dialectically dealt with, without any biological significance. Under specified conditions, the problem is asked with the end in view to control a certain experience in order to meet a certain vital need. We analyze sound waves out of the hearing experience not for phenomenalizing (in Kant's sense) our daily hearing experience, but for a further control of hearing experience. By translating hearing experience into sound waves, our hearing experience is enlarged, deepened, and makes possible such developments as the radio. Similarly the study of light or human history is not to prove or disprove any factual existence but to enlarge and deepen our daily experience.

(2) The problem of the antithesis between the selfhood or subject and the object. The whole traditional controversy about subjectivism and realism, idealism and materialism, knowing and known, is carried on in terms of this antithesis. From the view of experience as action, experience originally is a continuity. Men live in the world as fishes live in water. We never ask philosophically whether water exists for fishes or fishes for water. There can be no metaphysical separation of selfhood from object. From the view of experience as art, the conceptions of selfhood and object are both specifically constructed so that certain specific controls may be achieved. From this point of view, the antithesis between self and object is not universal and necessary. It is necessary when it is pertinent to a situation for a certain purpose. Pragmatically, selfhood usually means a logical location of responsibility and privilege. Object means objectives to be arrived at, to be used or to be discriminated. Self can never be a tran-

scendental ego and object is by no means an isolated objective reality.

(3) The problem of the relation between theory and practice. Experience in its daily use means practical transactions. These transactions are practical because they are practically our daily life. In this daily life scheme, theory seems to be a stranger. Contrasted with each other, the word "theory" connotes impractical, while practical means brutul, realistic, without any ideals. Viewing experience as an action and an art, theory becomes a function, participating in our practical transactions. Theory is theorizing, rationalizing, and planning. All meaningful life is a theory-practice duet. Theory is water, practice is vessel. They are each other's measurement. This is implied in every intelligent experience and intensively embodied in both artistic and scientific procedure.

Theory and practice therefore become a problem not in the sense of how to combine them theoretically or how to evaluate them in general in a hierarchy of values, as Aristotle did in his *Ethics*, but in the sense of how to render their combination more articulate, more significant for human life, in one word, more artistic.

SING-NAN FEN

NEW YORK CITY

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## BOOK NOTES

*Measurement of Consumer Interest.* Edited by C. WEST CHURCHMAN, RUSSELL L. ACKOFF, and MURRAY WAX. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1947. xi + 214 pp. $3.50.

This book is an attempt upon the part of a group of philosophers to put into practice what they have been preaching. It sets out to show that

> philosophy should immediately undertake an important role in science. It should act as a coördinator of research in the sense that it supplies general criteria for the adequacy of an experimental investigation. The new role of philosophy is that of a critique of experimental techniques; it attempts to define the most general conditions under which a procedure is said to be experimental, a process is said to be in experimental control, a question is said to have meaning.

The symposium presented in this book makes abundantly clear the difficulties involved in realizing the defined goal. The subject upon which the philosophers and specialists got together

is one of the most difficult in contemporary economics—what do people *really* want? The specialists have no long history of trial and error from which to draw general conclusions, and the philosophers are forced by the same circumstance to formulate their methodological generalizations from the natural science tradition. As a result, the philosophers and economists often appear to be speaking different languages: the economists describe their difficulties with the practical problem of consumer measurement, and the philosophers discuss the history of empiricism and the various attempts at general definitions. Neither group seems to understand very clearly what the other's problem is.

In spite of the inadequacies of the book, it should serve a useful function by pointing out the areas in which real problems exist between the practicing social scientist and the philosophical methodologist. A real service could be performed by one of the philosophers in the group if he wrote an essay stating how the philosophers helped the practitioners, and the practitioners the philosophers.

Economists will find this symposium packed with excellent data which is unavailable elsewhere. Philosophers will find Professor Singer's article on the necessity for cross-field coöperation stimulating and thoughtful. Both groups will find Mr. Churchman's philosophical discussion of the consumer and his interests a real contribution to social science methodology.

J. R. E.

*Wellsprings of the American Spirit.* A series of Addresses. Edited by F. Ernest Johnson. (Religion and Civilization Series.) New York: Institute for Religious and Social Studies. 1948. Distributed by Harper and Brothers. ix + 241 pp. $2.50.

In various notes on publications of the Institute for Religious and Social Studies, I have pointed to the weaknesses of such collective volumes as this. Unlike these others, this volume, distinguished by very careful planning and editing, reveals the symposium at its best. With two exceptions, the sixteen addresses included are worthwhile contributions both to the general theme to which they are directed and to the specific subjects discussed by the speakers. The reader has a clearer understanding at the end of the "various forms of expression in which the American people have undertaken in characteristic ways to make explicit the values of the democratic spirit," to quote the editor's somewhat verbose description of the intention of the volume.

I select for special comment here John Herman Randall, Jr.'s "The Spirit of American Philosophy" because of its relevance to the interests of readers of this JOURNAL. Randall's account is an attempt to take stock of those features which distinguish American philosophy from philosophy in America. He finds these features to be "(1) a pluralistic temper, (2) an experimental attitude, (3) an egalitarian spirit, and (4) an institutional approach" (p. 124). With these I have no disagreement, though I feel that Randall might well have added a fifth, concerned with the peculiarly American version of community in gregariousness—the sort of attitude which produces symposia as well as Rotarians. However, Randall gives the impression that it is only among American naturalists that this combination of features is to be found. Actually such American idealists as Royce and Alfred H. Lloyd as well as others of more recent vintage would fit Randall's criteria for American philosophers. Aside from these two points, it seems to me that Randall has made a good statement on a difficult theme.

J. L. B.

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## CURRENT JOURNALS

JOURNAL OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC. Volume 13, Number 3. A new theory of element and number: *Hao Wang.* A note concerning the paradoxes of strict implication and Lewis's system S1: *Sören Halldén.* Contextual definitions in nonextensional languages: *Gustav Bergmann.*

JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM. Vol. VII, No. 2. Composing in the Art of Lumia: *Thomas Wilfred.* Consistency as a Criterion in Art Criticism: *Helmut Hungerland.* On Visual Representation: The Meaning of Pictures and Symbols: *Richard Müller-Freienfels.* "Pure" Criticism and the History of Ideas: *R. H. Pearce.* The Aesthetic of the Petrarchan Sonnet: *N. C. Stageberg.* Psychical Distance in Indian Aesthetics: *P. J. Chaudhury.* Criteria for an Adequate Aesthetics; A Symposium: *George Boas, C. J. Ducasse, Katharine Gilbert,* and *S. C. Pepper.*

ANALYSIS. Vol. 9, No. 1. Moral Subjectivism: *H. W. B. Acton.* Subjunctive Conditionals: *Stuart Hampshire.* Mr. Ill-named: *P. T. Geach.*

ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE. Volume XVII, Cahier II. Sciences et Problèmes d'Unité. Source et limite de l'unité dans la mathématique: *G. Bouligand.* La crise de l'unité dans la physique contemporaine: *J. Abelé.* A la recherche de l'unité de la matière: *J. Moretti.* Le problème de l'unité de la vie: *J. Carles.* Polygénisme ou monogénisme: *J. Carles.*

ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR WIJSBEGEERTE EN PSYCHOLOGIE. 41e jaargang, Aflevering 1. Openingsrede bij het Tiende Internationale Congres v. Wijsbegeerte: *H. J. Pos.* Mededelingen naar aanleiding van het Congres. De exact-wetenschappelijke wijsbegeerte op het Congres van Amsterdam: *E. W. Beth.* De sectie filosofie van de geschiedenis en van de cultuur op het Congres te Amsterdam: *K. Kuypers.* Bartholomeus de Ligt 1883–1938: *G. A. v. d. Bergh v. Eysinga.* Over de problematiek van de wijsbegeerte der wiskunde van thomistisch standpunt: *B. G. Wiggers.*

THEORIA. Volume XIV, Part II. "The Right to Punish," published under the auspices of the UNESCO and Institut International de Philosophie on the occasion of the Xth International Congress of Philosophy, Amsterdam, August, 1948. The Right to Punish: *Åke Petzäll.* Le Droit de Punir: *Etienne De Greeff.* The Primary Reason for Punishment: *A. C. Ewing.* Le Droit de Punir: *Olof Kinberg.* Problems of Collective Responsibility: *Hermann Mannheim.* Is a Sociological Explanation of Law Possible? *Karl Olivecrona.*

GIORNALE DI METAFISICA. Anno III, N. 4. Forma e contenuto della moralità: *Augusto Guzzo.* In margine all'ontologia di Blondel: *Maria Teresa Antonelli.* Le Père Mersenne: *Robert Lenoble.* El filosofo español Jaime Balmes: *Miguel Flori.*

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA. Anno XL, Fascicolo III. Simbolismo del linguaggio e valore delle scienze: *C. Giacon.* Vie vecchie e vie nuove per ascendere a Dio: *A. Coccio.* La metafisica di Sartre: *V. Porcarelli.*

PRZEGLAD FILOZOFICZNY, Rocznik XLIV, 1–3. (Articles in Polish with brief English summaries.) Fifty Years of Philosophy in Poland, 1898–1948: *W. Tatarkiewicz, I. Dąmbska, B. Gawecki, T. Czeżowski, J. Sawaszkiewicz, J. Woroniecki.* Bibliography of Papers on Modern Polish Philosophy: *A. Grzegorczyk.* The Progress of Knowledge from the Theoretical Point of View: *J. Hosiasson-Lindenbaum.* Contributions to the Analysis of Reasoning: *T. Czeżowski.* About the So-called Objectless Names: *I. Dąmbska.* Thoughts on the Relativity of Value: *R. Ingarden.* Valuation:

*C. Znamierowski.* On the Essence of Ethical Judgment: *T. Kotarbiński.* What Are Acts of Heroism and Should They Be Carried Out?: *A. Nowicki.* The Central Problem of the Thomist Doctrine of the Soul: *S. Swieżàwski.* Modern Philosophy in Sweden: *K. Marc-Wogau.* Philosophy in France, 1939–1946: *A. Warkocz.* Philosophy in U. S. A., 1939–1947: *H. Hiż, W. Craig, A. Iwąnska, D. Wicentowicz-Hiż, H. W. Johnstone, H. D. Aiken.*

THE NEW SCHOLASTICISM. Volume XXII, Number 2. The Scope of Nature: Eight Tables: *D. C. O'Grady.* The Reputation of St. Thomas Aquinas among English Protestant Thinkers of the Seventeenth Century (cont.): *J. K. Ryan.* The Will as a Factor in Descartes' Proof for the Existence of Material Things: *H. G. Wolz.*

BOLETIN DEL GRUPO FILOSÓFICO DE LA HABAÑA. Año I, No. 3. Historia de los Congresos de Filosofía. Acontecimientos filosóficos. La Nueva Metafisica: *H. P. Llera.*

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## NOTES AND NEWS

The Twenty-second Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association will be held December 27, 28, and 29, 1948, at Stanford University, California. The program is as follows:

### MONDAY, DECEMBER 27

Annual Meeting of the Pacific Conference on the Teaching of Philosophy.

9:15 A.M. Business meeting.

10:00 A.M. Symposium, followed by general discussion.

Should ethics be taught (*a*) as a theory of moral value, (*b*) as a means by which the student may adjust himself to his changing social environment, or (*c*) as both?

*H. G. Townsend, Donald A. Piatt, Arturo Fallico*

Meeting of the Pacific Division.

2:00 P.M.

Radical Naturalism ..... *Edward O. Sisson*
"Cause" and "Influence" in Historical Writing .. *W. T. Jones*

7:30 P.M.

Ethics as a Science ..... *Frederick Anderson*
A Quantitative Criterion of Value ..... *Hugh Miller*
Values and Value Judgments ..... *Stephen C. Pepper*

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 28

9:00 A.M.

The Subject-Matters of Aesthetics and Criticism
*William B. Holther*

Some Complementary Key Terms in Aesthetics
*James L. Jarrett*

The Aesthetic Object ..... *A. P. Ushenko*

2:00 P.M.

Tautologies and Semiotic
*Charles E. Bures and George H. Watson*

Form and Content in Empirical Science .... *Herbert L. Searles*

Individual Responsibility as a Consequence of the Relativity of Freedom ..... *Hermann F. Schott*

7:00 P.M. Annual Banquet. The Presidential Address, "Philosophy, Pragmatism, and Human Bondage," by *Donald A. Piatt.*

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 29

9:00 A.M. Annual Business Meeting.

10:00 A.M.

The Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre ..... *Catherine Rau*

The Good—from the Absolute to the Relative to the Relative Absolute ..... *Barnet Savery*

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The Tenth Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Philosophical Conference was held at the University of Oklahoma, December 19, 20, and 21, 1948. The program was as follows:

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 19

7:30 P.M. Informal opening session. A Report from Europe: *Gustav Mueller;* A Report on the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy: *Marten ten Hoor;* World Philosophy and UNESCO: *F. L. Sampson.*

MONDAY, DECEMBER 20

9:00 A.M. Concerning Aesthetics and Ethics.

Aesthetic Contrast and Contradiction .... *Peter A. Carmichael*

Is Beauty Aesthetic Value? ..... *Ian McGreal*

Science and the Naturalization of Man ..... *J. S. Fulton*

The Creative Temper of the Moral Will ..... *R. A. Tsanoff*

2:00 P.M. Views on Logic and Metaphysics.
Concerning the Theory of Induction .....*Harold N. Lee*
An Intuitive View of Symbolic Logic .....*Arthur Bernhart*
A Paradox of Measurement .....*Edward G. Ballard*
De Biran on Psychology and Metaphysics ....*Gerard Hinrichs*
7:00 P.M. Annual Dinner. Presidential Address, "Existence and Its Polarities," by *Archie J. Bahm.*
9:00 P.M. Annual Business Meeting.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 21

8:45 A.M. Panel Discussion on Philosophy of Science.
The Status of Physical Laws and Fundamental Particles
*Carlton W. Berenda*
Science, Its Concepts and Laws .....*W. H. Werkmeister*
The Social Dimensions of Pure Research .....*David L. Miller*

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The 1948 Annual Meeting of the Charles S. Peirce Society will be held at 2:30 p.m., December 27, 1948, at the University of Virginia. Two papers will be delivered: "The Paradox of Peirce's Realism" by Manley H. Thompson, Jr., and "A View of the Future of Peirce's Ideas" by James K. Feibleman.

Anyone interested in further details concerning the aims, activities, and basis of membership in the Peirce Society should communicate with the secretary, Frederic H. Young, 77 Edgemont Road, Upper Montclair, New Jersey.

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The Association for Realistic Philosophy will meet at 2:00 p.m., December 28, at the University of Virginia. Professor Helmut Kuhn will read a paper entitled "Some Reflections on Reason and Being."

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The members of the Executive Committee of the Mountain Plains Philosophical Conference for 1948–1949 are as follows: Waldemar P. Read, chairman; J. Glen Gray (Colorado College), secretary; Bertram Morris; Floyd Sampson; Thomas Storer.

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Professor Horace M. Kallen delivered the Matchette Lectures for 1948 at Columbia University, December 7, 8, and 9, on the general subject, "Patterns of Progress." The three lectures were entitled "The Will to Progress," "Cultural Lag," and "Of Death and the Future," and they will be published in book form.

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